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Abstract:  
This paper examines occupational choices made by two cohorts of UK graduates.  
About 10% of graduates are in the same occupation as their father 6 or 11 years after 
graduation.  Males graduating from medicine or agricultural studies are more likely to 
be follower but the main observable determinants of the decision to follow appears to 
be father’s occupation and education.  Following in one father’s footsteps leads to a 
pay premium ranging from 5% to 8% for men but none for women.  As this pay 
premium increases with labour market experience, we conclude that it stems from 
intergenerational transmission of human capital rather than pure nepotism. 
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1  Introduction 
 
Frequently, it is observed that children are in the same occupation as one of 
their parent.  These dynasties are observed across time and countries and are more 
common in some occupations such as politician, entertainer, doctor, entrepreneur or 
farmer.  Three hypotheses can explain the choice of occupation made by the 
offspring.  First, as in the case of royalties, it is pure nepotism, where the parents use 
their position in order to obtain advantages for their children.  Second, in occupation 
where the setting costs are high, children following in their father’s footsteps face 
reduced costs compared to children of outsiders.  More generally, the family name 
can also be seen as goodwill, that employers or customers recognise.  Third, fathers 
may transmit their ability to their children either genetically or by transmission of 
human capital.   
These three explanations are not exclusive.  Despite the abundance of 
examples of dynasties, the economic literature has remained sparse even so 
meritocracy and intergenerational transmission of inequality have been popular fields 
of research (Arrow et al, 2000, Mayer, 1997, Neill, 1997).  In a series of articles, 
Lentz and Laband (1985, 1989) have focused on providing evidence on dynasties in 
various occupations, and finding the origin of the intergenerational similarity in 
occupational choice.  Lentz and Laband (1989) cannot reject that children of 
physicians have an insider’s advantage compared to competitors whose father is not a 
doctor when applying to medical school.  As children of physicians do not obtain 
better grades, the authors conclude that their initial advantage is mostly due to 
nepotism rather than any transmission of human capital from one generation to the 
next.  3
Following the seminal work of Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), most of the 
literature has concentrated on estimating the degree of inter-generational mobility in 
earnings
1.  Two strategies have been implemented, either estimating the correlation in 
earnings between siblings or twins, or estimating the correlation in earnings between 
father and son (daughter).  Solon (1999) provides an extensive survey of the empirical 
evidence.  The estimated intergenerational elasticity between father and children’s 
earnings is typically between 0.10 and 0.30 in the US; see also Becker and Tomes 
(1986) or Peters (1992), and 0.30 and 0.40 in the UK (Atkinson, 1981).  These 
coefficients suggested a high mobility in earnings or to put it in Galton’s words a 
“regression towards mediocrity”.  However, these results are sensitive to life cycle 
(age of children and fathers when surveyed) and windows effects (earnings in a given 
year are a poor proxy for permanent income).  Behrman and Taubman (1990), 
Zimmerman (1992), Solon (1992), Couch and Lillard (1998) and Aughinbaugh (2000) 
using average earnings on a period of time rather than a single year, estimate the 
intergenerational correlation in earnings to be in the order of 0.50 in the US.  This 
correlation has been decreasing for children born in the 60’s compared to those born 
in the 50’s (Mayer and Lopoo, 2001).  The larger correlation in earnings stems from a 
better measure of permanent income and also the use of more representative samples 
(see also Couch and Lillard (1998) on the effect of screening missing and zero 
earning). 
In the UK, intergenerational mobility appears to be lower than in the US.   
Dearden et al. (1997) report estimates of the correlation between father and child 
earnings as high as 60% for sons and 65% for daughters.  Contrary to US evidence, an 
upward sloping trend is observed, and children born in the 70’s are less mobile than 
                                                 
1 Mulligan (1999) provides a review of empirical works relying on the Becker and Tomes model.  4
those born in the 60’s (Blanden et al., 2001)
2.  As in the US (see Eide and Showalter, 
1999), the mobility is higher at the bottom of the distribution than at the top; the rich 
are less likely than the poor to regress to the mean
3.  These results suggest the 
existence of a ‘class society’ where intergenerational effects on income are strong
4.   
Knowing that father’s income is a strong determinant of his children’s income 
triggers questions on the origin of this correlation.  Education
5, intelligence
6, or 
idiosyncratic characteristics such as working behaviour (Altonji and Dunn, 2000), 
entrepreneurial skills (Dunn and Holtz-Eakin, 2000), or likelihood of unemployment 
(O’Neill and Sweetman, 1998) are the usual culprits.  Checchi (1997) estimates that 
for the US, Germany and Italy, half of the intergenerational immobility in income is 
due to lack of opportunity in education, as expected from Becker and Tomes (1979) 
or Conlisk (1977).  This paper builds on the idea that intergenerational correlation in 
earnings also stems from the correlation in occupational choice made by fathers and 
offspring (see Laband and Lentz, 1985 for an introduction).  It is of policy interest to 
examine the causes and consequences of occupational dynasty.  Insider advantage 
leads to the failure to guarantee the full exploitation of each individual’s potential, and 
results in an inefficient allocation of economic resources, which stunts economic 
                                                 
2 Social mobility was indeed much higher in the 30’s than in any recent period according to London 
based evidence (Baines and Johnson, 1999), but these results may be biased by the young age at which 
the sons were observed (14 to 17 years old) and the population surveyed (working class only). 
3 This is in contradiction with Conlisk (1977) or Siebert (1989) models, where due to liquidity 
constraints, intergenerational mobility in earnings is shown to be higher at the top than at the bottom of 
the earning distribution. 
4 Evidence from other countries suggests that mobility is higher in Canada (Corak and Heisz, 1999), 
Finland, Germany, Malaysia and Sweden than in the US and UK (Solon, 1999).  However, Solon 
stresses the limit of cross country comparisons due to data and technical differences 
5 Couch and Dunn (1997) for the US and Germany, and Dearden et al. (1997) for the UK, report a 
correlation of around 40% in education between father-son and mother-daughter pairs.  Eide and 
Showalter (1999) find that education mobility at the bottom of the distribution is high and tend to 
reduce intergenerational immobility in earning.  In opposition with these findings, Gang and 
Zimmermann (2000) find that parental educational attainment has no effect on the schooling 
achievement of non-native Germans. 
6 See Hernstein and Murray (1995) and the numerous replications of their work, among others Arrow et 
al.(2000) for the US and Dearden (1998) for the UK.  5
growth.  Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (1998) report that over the past 100 years, 
countries with a higher index of intergenerational social mobility achieved an average 
growth rate of 2.43% per year compared with 1.77% for the less mobile group
7.  
Additionally, Maoz and Moav (1999) conclude that higher intergenerational wage 
mobility reduces the dispersion of earnings
8.  
We focus on a sample of UK graduates: 10% of young graduates are in the 
same occupation as their father (defined by a two-digit occupational code) and 29% in 
the same occupational group
9.  Despite the homogeneity of the population studied, the 
probabilities of choosing the paternal occupation varies by occupation group and is 
the highest for children of entrepreneurs and professionals.  It also appears that for 
graduates, the probability of following into the paternal occupation is independent of 
gender.  Male graduates following in the paternal occupation benefit from a 5% wage 
premium compared to their peers whose father was not an insider, while no pay 
premium is found for women.  Focusing on men, the pay premium for following in 
the paternal occupation appears to increase with time on the labour market, which 
suggests that it originates from intergenerational human capital transfers rather than 
nepotism.  The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  In section 2, a model 
of occupational choice and its relationship to earnings differentials are presented.  The 
data and stylised facts are presented in section 3, followed by empirical evidence in 
section 4.  Section 5 concludes. 
                                                 
7 The Netherlands, France, Germany, Italy and the UK form the low mobility group, whereas Sweden, 
Japan, the US and Australia are high mobility countries. 
8 Maoz and Moav (1999) present an overlapping-generations model where economic growth is 
generated by an increase in the population’s education.  Education costs are a function of individual’s 
ability and the pay differential between educated and non-educated workers.  The capital market is 
imperfect and no borrowing to finance education is possible.  As a result, increase in education reduces 
the returns to education and therefore reduces financial constraints but also incentives to invest in 
education.  Under certain condition, the former effect is the stronger, hence the positive relationship 
between mobility and equality. 
9 The 90 occupation codes were concatenated into five categories: employees in managerial, 
professional or associate professionals, self-employed in these occupations and other occupations.  6
 
2 Model of occupational choice 
 
The literature on the inheritance of occupation in the UK can be briefly 
summarized by Egerton’s (1997, p 275) statement that “children of professionals both 
attain better qualifications, which are strongly associated with entry into professional 
occupations, and enjoy familial advantages in entry to professional occupations”. 
Robertson and Symons (1990) using the National Child Development Study, note that 
by the age of 23, 48% of sons are in the same occupational class as their father, 
however, since the authors defined only 3 occupational classes, this is not really 
informative.  Carmichael (2000) relies on the 1991 British Household Panel Survey to 
provide up-to-date evidence.  The paternal occupation when the respondents were 14 
years old is used to define six occupational groups.  She estimates that the paternal 
social class has a significant effect on the son’s social class but for daughters, the 
relationship is less stringent.  For lower social classes, female choices are dependent 
on the mother’s occupational achievement while for technical and professional 
occupations the father’s occupation is relevant.  This suggests that for our graduates, 
we should observe an effect of the paternal occupation on the occupational choice of 
females.  Despite the theoretical evidence (see below) linking occupational choice to 
earnings, none of the previous studies has estimated the effect of following on pay. 
Following Sjögren (2000a, 2000b), we introduce a model of occupational 
choice with heterogeneous human capital.  As all individuals are graduates, the choice 
of education and therefore occupation is not dependent on financial constraints and it 
is also assumed that the costs of a degree are the same for each subject.  With these 
simplifications, the choice of an occupation is only based on the maximisation of the  7
expected utility of lifetime earnings
10.  Formally, individual i chooses the occupation s 
out of the set of S possible occupations that maximises her utility (Ui).  As the utility 
is only derived from the wages obtain in occupation s, we have: 
   ) ( ( ) ( ) 1 Pr( si si i Y E Max U E S = = =      (1) 
Where s takes any value between 1 and S.  To simplify the model further, the 
choice of occupation is limited to the following alternatives: choosing the paternal, or 
choosing any other occupation.  Thus S can be described as a pair {f,u}, where f 
represents the paternal (more familiar) occupation and u all the other occupations.  
Furthermore, we assume that individuals only live for one period. Individual i chooses 
the paternal occupation (F) if her expected earnings in the familiar occupation are 
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As all individual are university graduates, we assume that the human capital of 
all individuals defers only by the endowment of job specific ability.  To simplify, we 
assume that there are only two types of abilities; Af is rewarded in the familiar 
occupation, while Au is specific to the other occupation.  The returns to ability (Wsi) 
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10 In this model, we do not take into account career changes over the life-cycle, see Flyer (1997) for a 
model incorporating them. 
11 See Jovanovic (1979) or Flyer (1997) for empirical evidence on the effect of higher moments of pay 
on occupational choice. 
12 Assuming some form of nepotism or insider advantage, individuals following into their father 
footsteps may have higher returns to their skills than their peers. Two individuals i and l working in the 
same occupation have different returns to their skills if i's father was an insider but l’s father was not.  
In the case of nepotism, we have  ul fi W W ≥   8
Individual i chooses occupation f if her endowment in ability Af is higher than 
her endowment in ability Au ceteris paribus.  It is easy to assume that the endowment 
in Af ability is a function of some characteristics of the father (e.g. attention or care) 
but also of the father’s occupation while Au is independent of the paternal occupation.  
Laband and Lentz (1985) stress the importance of the proximity between the 
workplace and home as a major factor influencing the transmission of skills from one 
generation to the next and thus the decision to choose father’s occupation.  Their 
argument explains why farmers have the highest intergenerational occupation 
correlation; as for farmers work place and dwelling are typically the same place. 
Sjögren (2000b) introduces uncertainty regarding one’s ability as a factor 
influencing the decision to follow.  Each individual has some information concerning 
her endowment in the ability specific to the familiar occupation but faces greater 
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Depending on their degree on risk aversion, it is possible to observe 
individuals choosing the familiar occupation even so their expected earnings in the 
unfamiliar occupation would be higher, thus intergenerational correlation in 
occupational choice and in earnings can be found even when equality of opportunity 
in education and on the labour market is guaranteed.  Figure 1 plots the hypothetical 
distribution of earnings in the familiar and unfamiliar occupation when au>af .  The  9
distribution of earnings is more spread in the unfamiliar than in the familiar 
occupation, thus some risk averse individuals will choose the familiar occupation 
even so its mean wage is lower than the mean wage in the unfamiliar occupation. 
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To summarize, individuals are more likely to follow in their father’s 
occupation, ceteris paribus, if their father was able to transmit his occupation specific 
ability and the more risk averse the individuals are.  Furthermore, following into the 
paternal occupation can be associated with higher earnings if insider advantage 
increases the returns to skills and/or if followers have higher ability.  We thus expect 
followers to enjoy a pay premium compared to their peers in the same occupation.  
This premium would be reduced if risk aversion is large and in the case of extremely 
risk-averse children, expected earnings in the paternal occupation may be lower than 
in the other occupation.   
  10 
3  Data and stylised facts 
A- Survey 
The empirical analysis is conducted on a population of UK graduates.  The 
Careers of Highly Qualified Workers Survey (HQS) is a survey of individuals who 
graduated from 29 UK higher education institutions in the academic year ending in 
1985 or 1990 (see Belfield et al (1997) for details on survey design).  The survey 
includes a section on previous educational achievement and degree results.   
Respondents briefly report their career history in a diary but also in more details at 
two/three fixed points since graduation: one, six and, in the case of the 1985 cohort, 
11 years after graduation.  For these points, graduates were asked to report their 
situation, including their annual gross wage.  The wage is reported on a 16-band scale, 
ranging from less than £2,000 to more than £50,000.  The range of each band varies 
within the earnings distribution from £2,000 to £10,000.  Less than 5% of working 
respondents did not report their earnings for 1996. Finally, the HQS includes some 
questions on the personal characteristics of the respondent, currently and at age 14.  
This includes the occupation of the main wage earner and the level of education of 
both parents. 
This survey of graduates has one drawback for this research: various variables 
rely on respondents recollecting their situation some 6, 11, or even 20 years (in case 
of the family background section) ago, which may lead to severe recollection bias 
(Beckett et al., 2001).  To limit the recollection bias, we drop all responses where the 
diary is not consistent with other information
13.   
                                                 
13 In the diary, respondents had to provide information on the number of months spent working, 
unemployed, in education and in other occupation since graduation.  Respondents for which the sum of 
these occupations did not correspond with their graduation date (plus/minus 12 months) were dropped 
(see Appendix A1)  11 
The HQS contains a total of 15530 individuals including diplomats, graduates 
and post-graduates.   Graduates from the Open University (a distance learning centre), 
the University of Buckingham (a private university) and mature students (older than 
30 on graduation) were dropped due to their atypical nature.  Other restrictions 
concerning employment history, current working status and paternal information lead 
to a raw sample of 7,463 observations.  The final sample contains full time workers, 
whose both parents were living at age 14 and who reported their current occupation 
(see Appendix A1, for details on the construction of the sample).  The analysis on the 
following decision is based on this sample. Additionally, for the analysis on the 
returns to following, a more restrictive sample is constructed.  Another 639 
observations are dropped due to misreporting on the pay or hours of work variables
14.  
All variables used in this analysis are summarised by cohort and gender in Table 1. 
The A-level score is the sum of the best 3 A-levels and reflects the academic 
ability before entering university.  The ability of the average student appears to have 
decreased over the five-year period, but this also reflects a change in our population.  
When around 5% of students graduated with a diploma in 1985, this proportion has 
soared to between 9% and 14% in 1990.  Diplomas are usually foundation courses 
thus demanding a lower academic background.  Furthermore, the share of students 
graduating from polytechnic institutions rather than universities doubled over the 
period.  Potential changes in the quality of the intake did not lead to lower output; the 
degree grades are similar for the two cohorts. Considering post-degree qualification, 
the younger cohort appears to be slightly less qualified but this may capture an age 
effect rather than a cohort effect.   
                                                 
14 There is no differences in the following behaviour of respondents who reported their pay correctly 
and those who did not, which lead us to assume that mis-reporting on pay was random in this 
subsample.  12 
 
Table 1: Summary table 
  Female 1985  Female 1990  Male      1985  Male     1990 
A level score  8.748  (4.275)  7.646  (4.387)  8.989  (4.731)  7.173  (5.086) 
No A level  0.084  0.106  0.123  0.207 
Professional qual.  0.316  0.256  0.303  0.253 
Master 0.179  0.117  0.194  0.165 
Phd 0.036  0.029  0.058  0.041 
Biology 0.111  0.092  0.061  0.052 
Agriculture 0.014  0.021  0.021  0.019 
Physics 0.089  0.084  0.160  0.130 
Maths 0.063  0.045  0.095  0.095 
Engineering 0.024  0.037 0.217 0.240 
Architecture 0.007  0.019 0.029 0.059 
Social science  0.140  0.146  0.136  0.125 
Administration 0.089  0.154  0.080  0.118 
Language 0.177 0.103  0.040  0.023 
Humanities 0.095  0.108  0.072  0.064 
Education 0.068  0.089  0.024  0.019 
Subject missing  0.013  0.015  0.007  0.010 
First 0.042  0.054  0.063  0.068 
2/1 0.282  0.331  0.278  0.277 
Unclassified 2  0.100  0.052  0.092  0.052 
Diploma 0.046  0.094  0.063  0.142 
University 0.761  0.482  0.834  0.467 
Employment  121.456  (14.605)  62.150  (12.734)  122.785  (14.577)  62.672  (13.661) 
Employment
2  149.647  (29.824)  40.247  (13.352)  152.889  (30.808)  41.144  (14.033) 
Size <25  0.169  0.192  0.167  0.142 
Size 25-99  0.219  0.215  0.159  0.167 
Size 100-500  0.172  0.188  0.214  0.228 
Size missing  0.017  0.025  0.011  0.011 
Permanent job  0.905  0.881  0.909  0.866 
London and SE  0.391  0.387  0.375  0.381 
Dad manager  0.186  0.180  0.193  0.195 
Dad professional  0.312  0.324  0.285  0.270 
Dad associate  0.058  0.054  0.056  0.055 
Dad self employed  0.109  0.095  0.104  0.099 
Observations 1017 2315  1646  2485 
The omitted categories are degree only, medical subject, grade 2/2 or lower, polytechnic institution, 
firm size larger than 500 employees, temporary job, not in London or South East, and father in an other 
occupation.  Standard deviation is reported in parentheses for non-binary variables. 
 
There is no significant variation in work experience by gender, which suggests 
that women still participating in the labour market had short maternity breaks.   
Despite the increase in higher education participation, students from middle-class and  13 
highly educated families still form the bulk of graduates; more than 50% of students 
have a father in a managerial or professional occupation.  
 
B- Intergenerational occupational choice 
 
For presentation purpose, five occupation groups are defined combining the 
one digit occupation code and employment status: employee manager, employee 
professional, employee associate professional, self-employment in a managerial, 
professional or associate professional occupation and all other occupation.  With this 
broad definition, about 29% of graduates are in the paternal occupational group.  This 
is much less than reported by Robertson and Symons (1990) who on a sample of 
children born in 1958 and observed at age 23 (NCDS), found that 48% have the same 
occupational status as their father (only 3 occupational groups).  The lower figure 
found for graduates could suggest that either education increases mobility (Becker 
and Tomes, 1979) or that mobility is higher for middle class children (Siebert, 1989) 
or a cohort effect, but this would be in contradiction with Blanden et al (2001).  At 
this level of aggregation, no clear differences by gender or cohort are observed, 
however as reported previously in the literature, following is dependent on the 
paternal occupation group.  Table 2 reports, in the first column of each graduate 
group, the proportion of graduates in a given occupation group whose father is in the 
same occupation, i.e. this is the main diagonal in a matrix of child and father 
occupation.  In the second column, we have the distribution of occupation at the 
paternal level.  If father’s occupation does not affect his children’s occupational 
choice then for each child’s occupational group, the distributions in each column 
should be identical.  However, in each occupation, graduates whose father was in this  14 
occupation are over-represented.  For example, 23% of self-employed females who 
graduated in 1985 have a father who is himself self-employed, when the proportion of 
self-employed in the father population was 11%.  The over-representation of offspring 
of self-employed workers in self-employment is significant for 1985 female.  In 
general, females’ occupational choices are not affected by their fathers’ choices; the 
distribution of fathers’ occupation for each daughters’ occupation is similar to the 
distribution at the fathers’ generation.  The only exceptions are self-employment 
(1985 cohort) and managerial (1990) occupations.   
 
Table 2: Father’s occupational group  
  Female 85  Male 85  Female 90  Male 90 
Occupation  Child’s  occ. dad Child’s  occ. dad Child’s  occ. dad Child’s  occ. dad 
Other  39  33      52***  36  38  35     45** 38 
Asso. Pro  05  06      11***  06 06 05 07 06 
Professional  33 31 31 28 34 32          30** 27 
Manager  23  19     25**  19      26***  18        27*** 20 
Self employed      23*** 11
       23***  11  12  10        18*** 10 
Note: We test whether offspring are over-represented in the father’s occupational group (t-test).  A *, 
**, and *** denote a 10% , 5% and 1% significant difference respectively between the proportion of 
father with the child occupation and the distribution of father ‘s occupation for this graduate group. 
 
The situation for males is rather different. For each occupation, sons following 
in their fathers’ footsteps are over-represented.  The difference is the largest for the 
self-employed; in 1985, 23% of self-employed have a father who was self-employed, 
when the proportion of entrepreneurs at the fathers’ generation is only 11%.  The 
links between father’s and children’s occupational choice appear to be stronger for the 
self-employed, which is consistent with the idea that young adults need transfers of 
human and/or physical capital to get into self-employment.  Having an entrepreneur 
father facilitates these transfers and appears to be a main determinant of self-
employment for the young generation.  Dunn and Holtz-Eakin (2000, p284) note 
“parents impart to their offspring entrepreneurial skills, as opposed to a taste for self- 15 
employment or a general knowledge of the business world”.  To summarise, sons but 
not daughters have a tendency to follow in their fathers’ footsteps.  Before concluding 
that women are less sensitive to their parents’ characteristics, it should be noted that 
women may be more likely to follow in their mother’s occupational choice as shown 
by Carmichael (2000) for some occupations. 
The bulk of the literature on following has used a broad definition of 
following, similar to the one presented above.  This is not completely satisfactory, as 
the categories are too broad; medical doctor and university professor are both 
professional occupation, but it will be difficult to argue that physician can transmit 
insider advantage to their offspring engage in a career as an economist. For the 
remainder of the analysis, the definition of following is refined.  Children are 
classified as followers if they are in the same occupation as their father, when 
occupation is defined using a 2-digit code (74 occupations).  The two cohorts of 
graduates behave similarly regarding their decision to choose the paternal occupation 
(Figure 2).  The 1985 graduates are marginally more likely than the younger cohort to 
opt for the paternal occupation, while women are less likely than men to choose the 
paternal occupation.   
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  16 
Laband and Lentz (1985, 1989) propose that following is more likely when 
contacts with the workplace as a child are possible (farmer, entrepreneur, entertainer, 
etc) which facilitates human capital transfers or when parents, through professional 
bodies may facilitate entry to education or the labour force (physician, lawyer) which 
we will qualify as nepotism.  By looking at the proportion of followers by subject 
studied at university, we find some mixed support in favour of Laband and Lentz’s 
claims.  In the following subjects more than 20% of graduates are followers: clinical 
medicine, botany, agriculture, other agriculture science, electrical engineering and 
social policy and administration
15.  As expected the list includes medics and 
agriculture related subjects but law students are excluded.  The results concerning 
electrical engineering and administration subjects are also surprising. 
 
C- Earnings of graduates 
 
Finally, the question of interest is whether following is associated with an 
advantage on the labour market.  Hourly pay is computed by using the mid point of 
the annual pay scale and the usual hours worked per week
16.  Here, we report 
evidence that male followers benefit from a pay premium.  As a gender pay gap is 
observed, we split the population accordingly.  Male graduates who followed their 
father’s footsteps have significantly higher hourly wages: £12.11 versus £11.65 on 
average.  Male followers earn more than their non-follower peers at each decile of the 
distribution (Figure 3A) but the difference reaching a maximum of £1.60 (10%) at the 
8
th decile, is only significant for the last two deciles.  For women, followers earn 
                                                 
15 More than 90% of respondents reported the subject of their degree (95 discrete choices).  Only 
subjects with more than 10 observations are included in the list. 
16 We assume that graduates work the same number of hours all year long. For this reason, we 
restricted the sample to individual working full time (30 hours).  17 
marginally more than non-followers in the bottom three deciles of the earnings 
distribution (see Figure 3B), however, no substantial difference can be observed on 
the overall distribution (£10.01 versus £9.97).  Following one’s father’s footsteps 
appears to have a positive effect on earnings for males but not for females.   
 
Figure 3A:Earnings for followers and non-followers by decile: Male 
decile







Figure 3B: Earnings for followers and non-followers by decile: Female 
decile









4  Empirical results 
 
So far, we have examined the decision to choose the paternal occupation and 
its effect on wages in isolation.  However, the personal characteristics of the graduate  18 
are also of importance in these relationships.  First, we examine the determinants of 
following in the paternal occupation. 
 
A- Following 
The econometric model on the determinants of the following decision takes 
the simple form of a probit model.  The analysis is done separately for males and 
females as previous evidence have shown dissimilarities in the behaviour of graduates 
by gender. 
The determinants of the current following status include cohort dummies, 
measures of educational ability (A-level and degree), subject of degree, type of 
institution and qualifications.  Table 3 reports results for women and men.  The 
younger cohort is less likely to follow but this could be due to an age effect rather 
than a cohort effect.  For women, a degree in education increases the likelihood of 
following in their paternal occupation, so does a degree in language or social science 
compare to a medical science degree.  Ability, as measured by A-level scores, has the 
expected effect of increasing the probability of choosing the unfamiliar occupation, 
but degree results do not have any effect.  The main determinants of the decision to 
follow are the paternal characteristics.  Having a professional or a self employed 
father increases the probability of following by 21% for women while surprisingly a 
father with a professional qualification reduces the probability of his daughter 
choosing the same occupation.  For men, the results are slightly different.  Only 
graduates from Agricultural subjects are more likely than medics to opt for the 
paternal occupation, which is in accordance with Lentz and Laband (1985).  The 
father characteristics also have a major effect on the decision to follow for men.  A 
professionally qualified father and a father in a middle class occupation are associated  19 
with a greater probability of the son choosing his father’s occupation.  These results 
are globally in accordance with previous empirical work.  The model does not provide 
a really good fit, as the determinants of followings are mostly unobservable 
characteristics.  
 
Table 3: Probability of following in paternal occupation- Marginal effects 
 Female  Male 
  dF/dx  St. error  dF/dx  St. error 
Cohort 90  -0.0100  0.0014  -0.0069  0.0002 
A-level   -0.0008  0.0003  -0.0003  0.0005 
No A-level  -0.0167  0.0006  0.0135  0.0112 
Prof. Qual.  0.0038  0.0087  -0.0041  0.0154 
Master -0.0079  0.0022  -0.0276  0.0120 
PhD -0.0030  0.0146  -0.0085  0.0104 
Biology 0.0007  0.0014  -0.0323  0.0132 
Agriculture 0.0358  0.0296  0.0423  0.0078 
Physic 0.0115  0.0149  -0.0309  0.0082 
Maths -0.0315  0.0028  -0.0525  0.0073 
Engineering -0.0102  0.0071  -0.0311  0.0034 
Architecture -0.0121  0.0053  -0.0222  0.0277 
Social science  0.0137  0.0031  -0.0199  0.0059 
Administration 0.0029  0.0160  -0.0266  0.0136 
Language 0.0182 0.0010 -0.0405  0.0077 
Humanities 0.0037  0.0241  -0.0404  0.0076 
Education 0.0444  0.0060  -0.0218  0.0085 
Subject missing  0.0390  0.0129  -0.0217  0.0053 
First 0.0042  0.0164  0.0480  0.0256 
Upper second  -0.0014  0.0056  0.0081  0.0083 
Unclassified 2
nd 0.0256  0.0014  0.0095  0.0205 
Diploma 0.0020  0.0183  0.0393  0.0275 
University 0.0031  0.0003  0.0129  0.0050 
Council -0.0054  0.0168  0.0011  0.0043 
Dad degree  0.0009  0.0059  0.0126  0.0132 
Dad prof. Qual  -0.0100  0.0026  0.0041  0.0017 
Dad manager  0.1541  0.0269  0.1279  0.0301 
Dad professional  0.2175  0.0158  0.2583  0.0016 
Dad associate  0.0793  0.0288  0.1301  0.0223 
Dad self emp.  0.2123  0.0005  0.3353  0.0136 
London & SE  0.0163  0.0073  0.0000  0.0026 
Obs. 3332  4131 
Pseudo R
2  0.12 0.16 
Log likelihood
  -814.88 -1122.84 
Note: Marginal effects estimated at the mean and robust standard errors corrected for cohort clustering 
are reported. The omitted categories are degree only, medical subject, grade 2/2 or lower, polytechnic 
institution, firm size larger than 500 employees, temporary job, not in London or South East, and father 
in another occupation.    20 
B- Current earnings 
As seen in the economic model above, workers sort themselves in the 
occupation with the highest expected wage.  Furthermore, a Chow test reveals that for 
males, the coefficients of the wage equation are significantly different for followers 
and non-followers.  Thus, we estimate a two-sided Roy model with endogenous 
selection.  For each individual i, earnings in the paternal (D=1) and unfamiliar (D=0) 
occupations are a function of the individual characteristics Xi, but the returns to these 
characteristics ( s β ) or the constants (δ s) are different in the two occupations.  ε s 
represents an error term and is normally distributed.  Thus, the individual earnings 
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The decision to follow in the paternal occupation is a binary variable.  It takes the 
value 1 if a latent, unobservable model, is greater than 0.  The latent model on the 
decision to follow is determined by a vector of personal characteristics (Z) explaining 
the decision to follow in the paternal occupation.  Assuming that the error terms in the 
latent model follows a normal distribution with unit variance; the model is completed 
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 where  φ  and Φ  are respectively the density and cumulative distribution 
function of the normal distribution. This method relies on the validity of the excluded 
variables in determining occupational choice but not earnings. 
Other methods to account for the possible endogeneity of the following 
decision exist.  Typically, we are interested in the effect of the treatment (following) 
on the treated (follower).  The outcome of interest takes the value Y1 if treated and Y0 
if not treated.  We also observed whether the individual was treated D=1 or not D=0.  
Let Z denote a vector of observable characteristics.  The effect of the treatment on the 
treated is then simply defined as: 
) 1 , | ( ) 1 , | ( 1 = − = = D Z Y E D Z Y E TT o      (9) 
The difficulty in estimating this effect comes from the non-observability of the 
second term in the LHS of (9)
17.  One solution is to rely on experimental data, where 
due to the random allocation of the subjects E(Y0|Z, D=1) = E(Y0|Z, D=0) 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have proposed that in absence of experiment, it 
may be possible to match each follower with a non-follower with the same observable 
characteristics.  Rather than requiring a match on each characteristic, Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1983) show that it is equivalent to condition on the estimated probability of 
being in the treatment group (follower).  The probability of selection is estimated by 
probit (as in section 4A) and individuals whose score are similar are matched.   
Following Smith and Todd (2001) notations, we define the probability of following 
as: P = Pr(D=1|Z).  If conditional on their observed characteristics, individuals can be 
                                                 
17 See Manksi (1995) for a simple introduction to the identification problem  22 
paired then the effect of following is simply the mean difference in earnings between 
all pairs.   
) , 0 | ( ( ) 1 , | ( 1 | 1 P D Y E E D Z Y E TT Y D P = − = = =     (10) 
This strategy relies on the conditional independence assumption; conditional 
on their observed characteristics, the decision to follow is random.  Dehejia and 
Wahba (1999) show empirically that the matched estimates are not particularly 
sensitive to the specification of the probit but this is in contradiction with Heckman et 
al. (1998) and Smith and Todd (2001). Two main methods to define score similarity 
exist.  First, individual for which the difference in score is less than an ad-hoc fixed 
limits are matched.  A larger distance increases the likelihood of a match but at the 
price of the match quality.  Individuals from the control group may be matched to 
more than one person from the treated group.  The second methods rely on creating 
for each follower, a synthetic individual based on kernel-weight average of the 
characteristics of the non-followers (Heckman et al. (1997). 
The empirical results are now presented.  According to Figure 3B, there is no 
pay premium to following for females so this section of the paper concentrates on 
male graduates only.  First, we estimate the earnings differentials between followers 
and non-followers, when not accounting for selection.  The OLS estimates of the 
determinants of log annual pay are presented in Appendix A2
18.  
Graduates from the 1990 cohort earn more than the 1985 cohort graduates 
after accounting for the differential in labour market experience.  This is consistent 
with evidence of increasing returns to schooling especially at tertiary level (Chevalier 
and Walker, 2001).  Even within this rather homogenous population of graduates, 
                                                 
18 As the annual pay variable is categorical, it can be argued that ordinary least square is inappropriate 
and that the equation should be estimated by interval regressions (Stewart, 1983).  However, using the 
band mid-points leads to similar results, so only OLS results are presented here.  23 
ability matters.  Each A-level point is associated with a pay increase of 1.4% and 
graduates with higher marks benefit from a significant pay premium (+13% for a first, 
+5% for a 2/1).  Returns to different subjects vary significantly, with medic at the top 
end of the distribution and humanities at the bottom (-39% compare to medics).   
Additional qualifications are also rewarded, with professional qualifications offering 
the highest returns (+12.6%) but academic qualifications (master and PhD) also 
leading to substantial gains (4.7% and 7.5% respectively).  Since the population of 
interest is relatively young, experience is linearly related to pay; each month of labour 
market experience leads to a pay increase of 0.9%.  Smaller firms pay less, while 
there is a premium for working in London and South East regions.  These results are 
standard.  The results for non-followers are similar in magnitude but with larger 
standard errors due to the smaller sample size and the hypothesis that the coefficients 
are the same for the two groups is rejected.   
Least squares estimation assumes that the decision to follow into the paternal 
occupation is exogenous which is in contradiction with the theoretical model of 
occupational choice presented above; this hypothesis is lifted by including a selection 
term in the wage equation.  The Heckman procedure requires Z to be different from 
X, i.e. some characteristics of the individual explain the decision to follow but have 
no effect on pay.  As shown previously, the main determinants of following is the 
paternal occupational group, we thus use a set of dummies on the paternal occupation 
as identifying variables (the selection equation is presented in Appendix A2).   
Graduates whose father was self-employed or in a middle class occupation are 
significantly more likely to choose their father’s occupation than those whose father 
was in another occupation.  This relationship is stronger for sons of professionals or 
entrepreneurs. The Heckman estimates are also presented in Appendix A2.  The  24 
inverse Mills ratio is significant in the non-follower regression, confirming that 
selection in followers is not random. The inclusion of the correction terms does not 
change the previous results substantially.  The pay differential between the two 
groups of graduates can be calculated from our results and are reported in Table 4.  
Followers benefit from a pay premium reaching 5%.  When accounting for selection, 
the estimated premium remains of the same order but is not significant due to larger 
standard errors. 
 
Table 4: Wage differential followers/non-followers in current job 
exp( ) ∆ β X g − 1  OLS Heckman 
At the non-followers mean  0.0510 (0.0206)  0.0506 (0.1140) 
At the followers mean  0.0485 (0.0204)  0.0504 (0.1062) 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses 
 
The identifying variables used to determine the probability of being in the 
paternal occupation are weak.  Cameron and Taber (2000) propose to run regressions 
of the instruments on the exogenous variables, the less the covariates are significant 
the better the instruments.  These regressions (available from the author) suggest that 
the instruments used may be problematic. 
Using results from our predicted probability of being a follower, we match 
individual according to their score.  The distribution of the estimated probability is 
plotted for the two groups in Figure 4.  It can be noted that our model does not 
provide a good fit as only a handful of followers have an estimated probability of 
being a follower greater than 0.5.  Thus, the matching model can be questioned, as the 
selection does not seem to be captured by the observable characteristics.   
  25 
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Note: Histogram of the estimated propensity score for followers (plain line) and non-followers 
(dashed line).  The first two bins have been truncated for presentation purpose and contain 1682 and 
645 observations in the non-follower group respectively.  There is no non-follower in the 0.55-0.60 
category and no observations for any group for propensity score higher than .6. 
 
The distributions for the two groups are different but overlap and thus make 
matching possible.  We report in Table 5 results for two distances and two matching 
techniques.  When using the smallest distance (0.001), we drop 25 followers out of 
the 399 observations for which no match could be found.  These non-matched 
observations are not distributed randomly and concerned individuals in the right tail 
of the propensity score distribution (score between 0.27 and 0.52). Increasing the 
minimum distance to (.01) increases the probability of matching and only one 
observation is left unmatched.  However, increasing the bandwidth is associated with 
an increase in bias and a reduction in the variance of the estimates. 
 
Table 5: Propensity score estimates of the current wage differentials 
  1 to 1 match  Kernel based match 
Match precision: .001  0.0722 (0.0434)  0.0546 (0.0284) 
Match precision: .01  0.0847 (0.0420)  0.0462 (0.0248) 
Standard error obtained by bootstrap (500 replications)  26 
One to one matching is the cruder technique of matching and is most sensitive 
to the shape of the score distributions for the two populations.  As mentioned above, 
with a match precision of (0.001) i.e. for two observations to be matched the 
difference in their score cannot be higher than 0.001, the right hand side of the 
distribution of followers cannot be matched.  The truncation of the distribution is 
likely to bias our results but the direction of the bias is not clear.  We may assume that 
those most likely to follow are those who gain the most from following hence our 
match estimator would be biased downward.  The empirical evidence confirms this 
assumption, as the estimated wage differential between followers and non-followers 
increases from 7.2% to 8.5% and becomes statistically significant at the 95% level 
when increasing the bandwidth.  The kernel-based results are in line with our 
parametric results.  The estimated pay gap is reduced and ranges between 4.6 and 
5.4%; both estimates are significant at the 90% confidence level.  The three different 
estimation techniques lead to similar estimates of the follower pay premium; 
followers earn between 5% and 8% more than their peers whose father was not in the 
same occupation as they are. 
 
C- Determinants of pay in the first year  
 
In an attempt to differentiate between the two main competing hypotheses 
explaining the follower’s pay premium, i.e. insider advantage versus transmission of 
human capital, we focus on the determinants of graduate earnings in their first year on 
the labour market.  The follower effect on the first job is expected to be of similar 
order as the current one, if the pay premium stems from the transmission of father’s 
characteristics.  However, if the pay premium is mostly due to returns to insider  27 
advantage, then the follower effect in the first job should be higher than the current 
follower effect, as the effects of insider advantage are supposed to decrease with 
tenure on the labour force.  This analysis is conducted on men working in their first 
year after graduation and reporting positive wages for that year.  This limits the 
sample to 3065 observations.  The regression includes the same variables as 
previously with the exception of the experience variables that are nil in the first job.  
A Chow test rejects the hypothesis that the estimates are different for the two groups 
of graduates, so we pool all graduates and estimate a single equation including a 
dummy for following.  The results are similar to those estimated on current earnings.  
The mean pay differential between followers and non-follower reaches 7% in their 
first job.  When accounting for education and some job characteristics, this premium 
is reduced to a statistically insignificant 3% (Table 6, column 1).  As previously, the 
decision to follow in the first job is not exogenous.  Hence, we correct for selection by 
including the inverse Mills ratio in the wage equation, estimates obtained by the 
Heckman procedure are reported in column 2.  As previously, we rely on the paternal 
occupation group to identify the decision to follow, hence these results are subject to 
the same cautions as those obtained for current wage.  The selection term is not 
significant, which further indicates the difficulties in estimating the decision to follow 
in the first job.  Accounting for selection, the pay premium for following into the 
paternal occupation in the first job is reduced to 2% and is not statistically significant.   
We also estimate the pay differential by matching techniques.  First, we 
estimate the probability of following in the first job (results in Appendix A3).  Once 
again the fit of the model is not really good, and none of the follower has a probability 
higher than 0.5.  The distributions of expected probabilities for the two groups are  28 
plotted in Figure 5.  Overall, the distributions are defined over similar interval, so the 
matching estimates should not be affected by selection bias. 
 
Table 6: Determinants of first job pay- Male only 
  OLS Heckman 
Follower in 1
st job  0.033   (0.023)  0.021   (0.095) 
Cohort 90  0.096   (0.015)  0.096   (0.015) 
A-level score  0.005   (0.003)  0.005   (0.003) 
No A-level  0.110   (0.028)  0.111   (0.028) 
Biology  -0.407   (0.052)  -0.409   (0.054) 
Agriculture  -0.368   (0.067)  -0.367   (0.067) 
Physics  -0.343   (0.043)  -0.344   (0.044) 
Maths  -0.355   (0.045)  -0.357   (0.047) 
Engineering  -0.321   (0.042)  -0.322   (0.043) 
Architecture  -0.378   (0.047)  -0.379   (0.048) 
Social science  -0.355   (0.044)  -0.357   (0.045) 
Administration  -0.373   (0.046)  -0.374   (0.047) 
Language -0.373   (0.060)  -0.375   (0.060) 
Humanities  -0.476   (0.053)  -0.478   (0.055) 
Education  -0.247   (0.057)  -0.248   (0.058) 
Subject missing  -0.230   (0.086)  -0.232   (0.087) 
First  0.084   (0.024)  0.085   (0.024) 
2/1  0.028   (0.016)  0.028   (0.016) 
Unclassified second  0.092   (0.030)  0.092   (0.030) 
Diploma  -0.034   (0.024)  -0.034   (0.023) 
University  -0.001   (0.019)  -0.000   (0.020) 
Size <25  -0.236   (0.027)  -0.236   (0.027) 
Size 25-99  -0.143   (0.020)  -0.143   (0.020) 
Size 100-499  -0.088   (0.017)  -0.088   (0.016) 
Size missing  -0.261   (0.079)  -0.262   (0.079) 
Permanent  0.200   (0.026)  0.200   (0.026) 
Lambda    -0.007   (0.056) 
Constant  9.623   (0.048)  9.625   (0.050) 
Observations 3065  3065 
R-squared 0.17   
Note: The omitted categories are degree only, medical subject, grade 2/2 or lower, polytechnic 
institution, firm size larger than 500 employees, temporary job, not in London or South East.   
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Note: Histogram of the estimated propensity score for followers (plain line) and non-followers 
(dashed line).  The first interval has been truncated for presentation purpose and contains 1605 
observations in the non-follower group.  There is no follower in the 0.50-0.55 category and no 
observations for any group for propensity score higher than 0.55. 
 
Matched estimates are sensibly higher than estimates obtained by parametric 
methods and range from 3.9% to 7.7% (Table 7).  However, all estimates fail to be 
statistically significant at the usual level.  The lack of precision of the estimates may 
stem from the low fit in the estimated probabilities of following in the first job.   
Hence the assumption of conditional independence may not be satisfied.   
 
Table 7: Propensity score estimates of the first job pay differential 
  1 to 1 match  Kernel based match 
Match precision: .001  0.063 (0.042)  0.056 (0.030) 
Match precision: .01  0.077 (0.041)  0.039 (0.026) 
Standard error obtained by bootstrap (500 replications) 
 
We assume that nepotism would be at its maximum when young graduates 
enter the labour market, as with time the true quality of the graduates would have 
been revelled.  On the other hand, if we assume that the premium enjoyed by  30 
followers comes from the transmission of human capital from the father to the son, 
then it is possible that the benefits of this extra human capital are reaped through time.  
Our previous results suggests that returns to following are stable or increase with time 
(depending on estimation techniques), hence it appears that the follower premium 
stem from intergenerational transmission of human capital rather than nepotism.   
Four groups of graduates can be distinguished based on their first and current 
job following status.  Focusing on male only, we find that 20% (59) of first job 
followers are in a non-paternal occupation in 1996. On the other hand, 78 graduates 
who did not choose the paternal occupation in their first job are followers by 1996.  
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Graduates who are always in the paternal occupation (foll/foll) earn 
significantly more than those who were never followers (non foll/non foll) at both 
points in time.  Graduates who started in the paternal occupation but then moved 
                                                 
19 Panel data analysis could improve this analysis.  However, as the changes of status are not 
independent of the pay differential generated by the change, they will still be subject to some 
endogeneity problems.  Furthermore, the estimation would be problematic due to the small number of 
respondents changing status during the period of observation.  31 
away from it, had lower starting salary (not significant) but higher current earnings 
than graduates who never followed.  This could be consistent with Sjögren’s idea 
(2000b), that some graduates choose the paternal occupation due to risk aversion.  
However, with time, these graduates discover their endowment in skills and readjust 
their choice, as their potential wages are higher in the non-paternal occupation.   
Graduates who did not start in the paternal occupation but are currently followers earn 
between the amount earned by never and always followers, which could confirm that 
returns to following are not instantaneous but need time to materialise.   
 
5  Conclusion 
 
Inequality of opportunities has proven to be a topic of great interest to social 
scientists; the inheritance of occupation is no exception.  We rely on a sample of UK 
graduates to determine whether intergenerational correlation in earnings could stem 
from intergenerational correlation in occupational choice.  Between 8% and 10% of 
young graduates choose their fathers’ occupation.  This choice allows them to secure 
an earnings premium of 5% to 8% for males but none for females.  Nepotism and the 
transfer of human capital from one generation to the next could generate this pay gap. 
These two hypotheses differ in the way they affect pay through time.  As the influence 
of the father on his son’s career decreases with the labour attachment of the child, the 
effect of nepotism on pay should be maximum at the beginning of the son’s career.  
The transmission of human capital on the other hand, should not lead to decreasing 
returns over time. As returns to following increases over the graduates’ career, the 
follower premium stems from the transmission of human capital from one generation 
to the next.  Further research on the mechanism of transmission could explain  32 
differences in following rate between occupations.  Additionally, a database 
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APPENDIX 
Table A1: Sample size 
 
N=15,530 All  observations 
-        772  Disable 
-      2,159  Distance learning centre (Open University) 
-      1,761  Age on graduation greater than 30 
-      1,299  History of employment missing or incomplete 
-        660  Not working in 1996 
-        710  Not working full time in 1996 
-        384  Father’s occupation missing 
-        114  No father when aged 14 
-          24  No mother when aged 14 
-        184  Occupation missing in 1996 
      7,463 
 
-        235  Pay 1996 missing 
-        363  Hours worked missing, or <30 or >70 
-          41  Pay per hour less than £3.00 
      6,824  38 
Table A.2: Current log annual pay: Male 
 
  OLS Heckman 
  Non Follower  Follower  Non Follower  Follower 
  Coeff S.E Coeff S.E  Coeff  S.E  Coeff  S.E 
Cohort 90  0.2142  0.0449  0.3671  0.1602  0.2115  0.0447  0.3681 0.1544 
A level score  0.0137  0.0024  0.0169  0.0064  0.0137  0.0024  0.0169 0.0062 
No A-level  0.0885  0.0261  0.1322  0.0719  0.0879  0.0260  0.1323 0.0689 
Professional q.  0.1265  0.0150  0.1639  0.0438  0.1269  0.0150  0.1642 0.0420 
Master 0.0474  0.0179  0.1184  0.0586  0.0489  0.0178  0.1176 0.0569 
Phd 0.0751  0.0339  0.0306  0.1256  0.0755  0.0338  0.0315 0.1203 
Biology -0.2742  0.0447  -0.2703  0.1655  -0.2709  0.0446  -0.2730 0.1624 
Agriculture -0.3408  0.0744  -0.3119  0.1373  -0.3481  0.0737  -0.3112 0.1319 
Physics -0.2237  0.0391  -0.2559  0.0891  -0.2197  0.0390  -0.2575 0.0901 
Maths -0.1139  0.0410  -0.1466  0.0943  -0.1066  0.0409  -0.1498 0.1064 
Engineering -0.1564  0.0384  -0.1599  0.0851  -0.1524  0.0384  -0.1614 0.0861 
Architecture -0.3390  0.0407  -0.4313  0.1071  -0.3352  0.0406  -0.4332 0.1079 
Social science  -0.1922  0.0410  -0.0788  0.0870  -0.1898  0.0408  -0.0803 0.0869 
Administration -0.1735  0.0416  -0.1081  0.1043  -0.1705  0.0415  -0.1102 0.1077 
Language -0.2313  0.0562  -0.0197  0.1927  -0.2262  0.0559  -0.0221 0.1870 
Humanities -0.3908  0.0479  -0.1696  0.1280  -0.3855  0.0477  -0.1716 0.1301 
Education -0.2951  0.0460  -0.3488  0.1159  -0.2905  0.0459  -0.3493 0.1119 
Subject missing  -0.2760  0.1050  0.0847  0.1430  -0.2722  0.1045  0.0843 0.1377 
First 0.1286  0.0270  0.1072  0.0749  0.1264  0.0269  0.1083 0.0756 
2/1 0.0532  0.0159  0.0324  0.0498  0.0528  0.0158  0.0327 0.0483 
Unclassified 2  0.0194  0.0328  0.0040  0.0673  0.0183  0.0327  0.0043 0.0646 
Diploma -0.0737  0.0229  -0.1486  0.0702  -0.0756  0.0229  -0.1479 0.0687 
University 0.0361  0.0189  0.0705  0.0591  0.0344  0.0187  0.0710 0.0577 
Experience 0.0092  0.0016  0.0045  0.0052  0.0092  0.0016  0.0044 0.0050 
experience
2 -0.0005  0.0010  0.0032  0.0033  -0.0006  0.0010  0.0033 0.0032 
Firm size <25  -0.1346  0.0257  -0.1118  0.0619  -0.1373  0.0254  -0.1112 0.0604 
Firm size 25-99  -0.0636  0.0174  0.0041  0.0591  -0.0632  0.0174  0.0043 0.0568 
Firm size 99-500  -0.0329  0.0144  -0.0381  0.0498  -0.0336  0.0143  -0.0376 0.0489 
Firm size missing  -0.1215  0.1036  -0.5299  0.1225  -0.1223  0.1030  -0.5300 0.1175 
Permanent   -0.0077  0.0271  0.2050  0.0844  -0.0070  0.0270  0.2052 0.0815 
London and SE  0.1482  0.0131  0.1043  0.0393  0.1478  0.0131  0.1043 0.0378 
Constant 9.1962  0.0982  8.9693  0.2706  9.1900  0.0978  8.9626 0.2843 
Lambda         0.0442  0.0204  0.0048 0.0709 
Obs. 3596  399  3596  399 
R
2/Wald test  33.43  43.44  χ
2(31)=1829.37  χ
2(31)=404.77 
Ind of eq.          χ
2(1)=4.58  χ
2(1)=0.00 
Note: Robust standard errors corrected for cohort clustering are reported. The omitted categories are 
degree only, medical subject, grade 2/2 or lower, polytechnic institution, firm size larger than 500 
employees, temporary job, not in London or South East, and father in another occupation.   
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Selection equations: Current job 
 Non  Follower  Follower 
 Coeff  S.E  Coeff  S.E 
Cohort 90  -0.3069 0.1954 0.3106  0.1943
A level score  0.0043 0.0109 -0.0050  0.0108
No A-level  -0.0793 0.1231 0.0754  0.1228
Professional q.  0.0525 0.0705 -0.0548  0.0705
Master 0.2157 0.0887 -0.2148  0.0888
Phd -0.0301 0.1578 0.0299  0.1581
Biology 0.3516 0.1774 -0.3401  0.1766
Agriculture -0.2002 0.2029 0.2014  0.2027
Physics 0.3261 0.1426 -0.3240  0.1432
Maths 0.6998 0.1672 -0.7032  0.1676
Engineering 0.3301 0.1334 -0.3253  0.1336
Architecture 0.2388 0.1906 -0.2390  0.1909
Social science  0.2032 0.1415 -0.2024  0.1422
Administration 0.3295 0.1536 -0.3240  0.1539
Language 0.4797 0.2247 -0.4798  0.2254
Humanities 0.4662 0.1724 -0.4639  0.1722
Education 0.2535 0.2293 -0.2572  0.2300
Subject missing  0.2602 0.3091 -0.2463  0.3085
First -0.3136 0.1235 0.3138  0.1237
2/1 -0.0822 0.0746 0.0814  0.0747
Unclassified 2  -0.0366 0.1173 0.0380  0.1175
Diploma -0.2644 0.1126 0.2638  0.1126
University -0.1298 0.0889 0.1326  0.0890
Experience 0.0021 0.0062 -0.0024  0.0061
experience
2 -0.0042 0.0038 0.0043  0.0038
Firm size <25  -0.1868 0.0875 0.1896  0.0870
Firm size 25-99  0.0043 0.0904 -0.0067  0.0906
Firm size 99-500  -0.0837 0.0783 0.0829  0.0784
Firm size missing  -0.0994 0.3056 0.1111  0.3006
Permanent   -0.0277 0.0963 0.0199  0.0950
London and SE  -0.0078 0.0617 0.0068  0.0618
Dad manager  -0.7626 0.1086 0.7606  0.1095
Dad professional  -1.3960 0.0965 1.3919  0.0962
Dad associate  -0.6812 0.1620 0.6780  0.1625
Dad entrepreneur  -1.4040 0.1111 1.4014  0.1113
constant 2.4480 0.4031 -2.4294  0.3981
Observation 3596  399 
Note: Robust standard errors corrected for cohort clustering are reported. The omitted categories are 
degree only, medical subject, grade 2/2 or lower, polytechnic institution, firm size larger than 500 
employees, temporary job, not in London or South East, and father in another occupation.   
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Table A3: Follower status in first job 
 Coef.  Std.  Err 
Cohort 90  0.0674  0.0136 
A level score  -0.0007  0.0039 
No A-level  0.1320  0.0131 
Professional q.  0.0036  0.0251 
Master -0.2411  0.0168 
Phd -0.3406  0.2096 
Biology -1.1268  0.0582 
Agriculture 0.2055  0.1675 
Physics -0.3985  0.1515 
Maths -0.8773  0.0686 
Engineering -0.4007  0.0267 
Architecture -0.3357  0.4546 
Social science  -0.4410  0.0850 
Administration -0.4564  0.1492 
Language -0.5420  0.0122 
Humanities -0.7145  0.0824 
Education -0.2601  0.1049 
Subject missing  -0.7232  0.2970 
First 0.3413  0.1757 
2/1 0.1121  0.0252 
Unclassified 2  0.0333  0.1994 
Diploma 0.2918  0.0637 
University 0.2221  0.0885 
Council house  -0.1116  0.0449 
Dad degree  -0.0932  0.0739 
Dad prof. Qual.  -0.0483  0.0897 
Dad manager  0.2803  0.0247 
Dad professional  1.2211  0.0551 
Dad associate  0.5030  0.0006 
Dad entrepreneur  1.0907  0.0809 
constant 0.0820  0.0400 
_cons -1.8255  0.1691 
Pseudo R
2  0.1661 
observations 3125 
 